restore, or enhance habitat, migration routes, and connectivity; improve mapping efforts to better understand how and where wildlife move; and allow funds from the existing Partners for Fish and Wildlife Program to be used for wildlife movement. The bill would also direct the Departments of the Interior, Agriculture, and Transportation to coordinate actions and funding for programs established by the bill and to improve coordination with States, Tribes, and non-governmental partners. Finally, the bill would ensure that the legislation is only applied in a voluntary manner while protecting valid existing and private rights, military readiness, private property, public access, and the authority or jurisdiction of States and Tribes.

In 2018, the Interior Secretary signed secretarial order 3362, ''Improving Habitat Quality in Western Big-Game Winter Range and Migration Corridors,'' in 11 Western States. To implement the secretarial order, Federal Agencies have used funding from relevant existing appropriations to support habitat improvement projects and research in areas identified by States for a limited set of big game species. While implementation of the secretarial order has been successful, Congress should create formal and dedicated programs in order to maintain this important work while expanding implementation to species beyond just big game and across the entire United States.

This bill would also build on the success of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, which made an unprecedented $350 million investment in the Department of Transportation to implement a first-of-its-kind pilot program to make roads safer, prevent wildlife-vehicle collisions, and improve habitat connectivity. While this funding is critical, we must think bigger than individual wildlife crossings to boost wildlife connectivity at the landscape scale across the country.

I want to thank Representative ZINKE for leading this bill in the House, and I hope all of our colleagues will join us in supporting this bipartisan bill to improve habitat connectivity and maintain intact wildlife corridors for species—big and small.

By Mr. SCHUMER (for himself, Ms. HIRONO, Mr. SCHATZ, Mr. LUJÁN, Mr. REED, Mr. BLUMENTHAL, Mr. CARPER, Mr. WELCH, Mr. HICKENLOOPER, Mr. CASEY, Mr. COONS, Mrs. SHAHEEN, Ms. BALDWIN, Mr. MERKLEY, Mr. CARDIN, Mr. DURBIN, Ms. WARREN, Mrs. MURRAY, Mr. VAN HOLLEN, Mr. MARKEY, Ms. DUCKWORTH, Ms. KLOBUCHAR, Ms. BUTLER, Mr. WHITEHOUSE, Mr. SANDERS, Mr. BOOKER, Mrs. GILLIBRAND, Mr. WYDEN, Mr. KING, Mr. HEINRICH, Ms. STABENOW, Mr. PADILLA, Mr. PETERS, Mr. WARNOCK, Ms. SMITH, Mr. KELLY, and Ms. CANTWELL):

S. 4973. A bill to reassert the constitutional authority of Congress to determine the general applicability of the criminal laws of the United States, and for other purposes; read the first time.

Mr. SCHUMER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S. 4973

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ''No Kings Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that—

(1) no person, including any President, is above the law;

(2) Congress, under the Necessary and Proper Clause of section 8 of article I of the Constitution of the United States, has the authority to determine to which persons the criminal laws of the United States shall apply, including any President;

(3) the Constitution of the United States does not grant to any President any form of immunity (whether absolute, presumptive, or otherwise) from criminal prosecution, including for actions committed while serving as President;

(4) in The Federalist No. 69, Alexander Hamilton wrote that there must be a difference between the ''sacred and inviolable'' king of Great Britain and the President of the United States, who ''would be amenable to personal punishment and disgrace'' should his actions violate the laws of the United States;

(5) the United States District Court for the District of Columbia correctly concluded in United States v. Trump, No. 23–257 (TSC), 2023 WL 8359833 (D.D.C. December 1, 2023) that ''former Presidents do not possess absolute federal criminal immunity for any acts committed while in office'', that former Presidents ''may be subject to federal investigation, indictment, prosecution, conviction, and punishment for any criminal acts undertaken while in office'', and that a ''four-year service as Commander in Chief [does] not bestow on [a President] the divine right of kings to evade the criminal accountability that governs his fellow citizens'';

(6) similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit correctly affirmed in United States v. Trump, 91 F.4th 1173 (D.C. Cir. 2024) that ''separation of powers doctrine does not immunize former Presidents from federal criminal liability'' for their official actions that ''allegedly violated generally applicable criminal laws'' and acknowledged that the Founding Fathers ''stresse[d] that the President must be unlike the 'king of Great Britain,' who was 'sacred and inviolable.' The Federalist No. 69, at 337–38'';

(7) the Supreme Court of the United States, however, vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and incorrectly declared in Trump v. United States, No. 23–939, 2024 WL 3237603 (U.S. July 1, 2024) that ''the President is absolutely immune from criminal prosecution for conduct within his exclusive sphere of constitutional authority'' and that a President ''is entitled, at a minimum, to a presumptive immunity from prosecution for all his official acts'', assertions at odds with the plain text of the Constitution of the United States; and

(8) Congress has explicit and broad authority to make exceptions and regulations to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States under clause 2 of section 2 of article III of the Constitution of the United States.

(b) PURPOSES.—The purposes of this Act are to—

(1) reassert the constitutional authority of Congress to determine the general applicability of the criminal laws of the United States, including to Presidents and Vice Presidents;

(2) clarify that a President or Vice President is not entitled to any form of immunity from criminal prosecution for violations of the criminal laws of the United States unless specified by Congress; and

(3) impose certain limitations on the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States to decide questions related to criminal immunity for Presidents and Vice Presidents.

SEC. 3. NO PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY FOR CRIMES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—

(1) NO IMMUNITY.—A President, former President, Vice President, or former Vice President shall not be entitled to any form of immunity (whether absolute, presumptive, or otherwise) from criminal prosecution for alleged violations of the criminal laws of the United States unless specified by Congress.

(2) CONSIDERATIONS.—A court of the United States may not consider whether an alleged violation of the criminal laws of the United States committed by a President or Vice President was within the conclusive or preclusive constitutional authority of a President or Vice President or was related to the official duties of a President or Vice President unless directed by Congress.

(b) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to immunize a President, former President, Vice President, or former Vice President from criminal prosecution for alleged violations of the criminal laws of the States.

SEC. 4. JUDICIAL REVIEW.

(a) CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, for any criminal proceeding commenced by the United States against a President, former President, Vice President, or former Vice President for alleged violations of the criminal laws of the United States, the following rules shall apply:

(1) The action shall be filed in the applicable district court of the United States or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

(2) The Supreme Court of the United States shall have no appellate jurisdiction, on the basis that an alleged criminal act was within the conclusive or preclusive constitutional authority of a President or Vice President or on the basis that an alleged criminal act was related to the official duties of a President or Vice President, to (or direct another court of the United States to)—

(A) dismiss an indictment or any other charging instrument;

(B) grant acquittal or dismiss or otherwise terminate a criminal proceeding;

(C) halt, suspend, disband, or otherwise impede the functions of any grand jury;

(D) grant a motion to suppress or bar evidence or testimony, or otherwise exclude information from a criminal proceeding;

(E) grant a writ of habeas corpus, a writ of coram nobis, a motion to set aside a verdict or judgment, or any other form of post-conviction or collateral relief;

(F) overturn a conviction;

(G) declare a criminal proceeding unconstitutional; or

(H) enjoin or restrain the enforcement or application of a law.

(b) CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, for

any civil action brought for declaratory, injunctive, or other relief to adjudge the constitutionality, whether facially or as-applied, of any provision of this Act (including this section), or to bar or restrain the enforcement or application of any provision of this Act (including this section) on the ground of its unconstitutionality, the following rules shall apply:

(1) A plaintiff may bring a civil action under this subsection, and there shall be no other cause of action available.

(2) Only a President, former President, Vice President, or former Vice President shall have standing to bring a civil action under this subsection.

(3) A facial challenge to the constitutionality of any provision of this Act (including this section) may only be brought not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act. An as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of the enforcement or application of any provision of this Act (including this section) may only be brought not later than 90 days after the date of such enforcement or application.

(4) A court of the United States shall presume that a provision of this Act (including this section) or the enforcement or application of any such provision is constitutional unless it is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that such provision or its enforcement or application is unconstitutional.

(5) The civil action shall be filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, which shall have exclusive jurisdiction of a civil action under this subsection. An appeal may be taken from the district court to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear an appeal in a civil action under this subsection.

(6) In a civil action under this subsection, a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit shall be final and not appealable to the Supreme Court of the United States.

(7) The Supreme Court of the United States shall have no appellate jurisdiction to declare any provision of this Act (including this section) unconstitutional or to bar or restrain the enforcement or application of any provision of this Act (including this section) on the ground of its unconstitutionality.

(c) CLARIFYING SCOPE OF JURISDICTION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—If an action at the time of its commencement is not subject to subsection (a) or (b), but an amendment, counterclaim, cross-claim, affirmative defense, or any other pleading or motion is filed such that the action would be subject to subsection (a) or (b), the action shall thereafter be conducted pursuant to subsection (a) or (b), as applicable.

(2) STATE COURTS.—An action subject to subsection (a) or (b) may not be heard in any State court.

(3) SUA SPONTE RELIEF.—No court may issue relief sua sponte on the ground that a provision of this Act (including this section), or its enforcement or application, is unconstitutional.

SEC. 5. SEVERABILITY.

If any provision of this Act, or application of such provision to any person or circumstance, is held to be unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act, and the application of the provisions of this Act to any person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby.

By Mr. DURBIN (for himself, Mr. SCHATZ, and Mrs. GILLIBRAND):

S. 4990. A bill to comprehensively combat child marriage in the United States; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. DURBIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S. 4990

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ''Child Marriage Prevention Act of 2024''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) Over 300,000 minors were married in the United States between 2000 and 2018. Most were wed to adult men and some were as young as 10 years of age, though most were 16 or 17 years of age.

(2) Child marriage limits educational opportunities. Women who marry before they turn 19 years of age are 50 percent more likely to drop out of high school and 4 times less likely to graduate from college.

(3) Girls who marry in their early teens are up to 31 percent more likely to live in future poverty.

(4) Child marriage has harmful consequences for mental and physical health. Women who married as children have higher rates of certain psychiatric disorders. Another study found that women who marry before 19 years of age have a 23 percent greater risk of developing a serious health condition, including diabetes, cancer, heart attack, or stroke.

(5) Child marriage can facilitate physical, emotional, and verbal abuse. Girls and young women 16 to 24 years of age experience the highest rates of intimate partner violence, and girls 16 to 19 years of age experience intimate partner violence victimization rates that are almost triple the national average. Further, the majority of States allow marriage to be used as a defense to statutory rape laws, which can incentivize perpetrators to marry victims to preempt prosecutions.

(6) 70 to 80 percent of marriages entered into when at least one person is under 18 years of age ultimately end in divorce. According to one study based on census data, 23 percent of children who marry are already separated or divorced by the time they turn 18 years of age.

(7) Depending on the State, a child facing a forced marriage or a married minor trying to leave may find themselves with few options. A minor trying to avoid a forced marriage may not be able to leave home without being taken into custody and returned by police and may not be able to stay in a domestic violence shelter at all or in a youth shelter for longer than a few days. Friends or allies of a child escaping a marriage who offer to take them in could risk being charged with contributing to the delinquency of a minor or harboring a runaway. And, if the minor attempts to obtain a home of their own, they may find no one willing to rent to them, because in many circumstances, minors cannot be held to contracts they enter.

(8) Depending on the State, a minor who is being forced or coerced into marriage may not be entitled to file on their own for a protective order. Further, not all States clearly treat married minors as emancipated, meaning they still have the limited legal status and rights of a child and face similar vulnerabilities and challenges seeking help.

(9) Child marriage in the United States can also be facilitated through the immigration system. Subject to rare exceptions, United States immigration law recognizes marriages as valid if they were legal where they took place and where the parties will reside. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services reported that between fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2017, it approved 8,686 petitions for spousal or fiancé visas that involved at least one minor, though it remains unclear how many of these visas were ultimately approved by the Department of State. However, approximately 2.6 percent of fiancé and spousal petitions were returned unapproved to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services between fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2017. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the United States issued a visa to a significant number of the spouses and fiancés named on the 8,686 petitions

(10) Four States set no statutory minimum age for marriage. In 13 States and the District of Columbia, clerks acting on their own – without judges – can issue marriage licenses for all minors. Four States permit pregnancy to lower the minimum marriage age and in one State, Mississippi, the statute sets different conditions for approvals for girls and boys.

(11) There is a growing movement to eliminate child marriage in the United States and 13 States – Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Minnesota, Rhode Island, New York, Massachusetts, Vermont, Connecticut, Michigan, Washington, Virginia, and New Hampshire have set the minimum age for marriage at 18 years of age, with no exceptions. Since 2016, a total of 35 States have enacted new laws to end or limit child marriage with 5 more States requiring parties to be legal adults (meaning that the only exception to the requirement to be 18 years of age to be married is for certain court-emancipated minors). Until all States take action, however, the patchwork of State laws will continue to put all children, particularly girls, at risk, given the ease with which they can be taken out of their home State into another State with lax or no laws.

(12) The foreign policy of the United States is already imbued with these understandings that child marriage is harmful and should be prevented, including the following:

(A) The Department of State in its Foreign Affairs Manual states the Federal Government view of ''forced marriage to be a violation of basic human rights. It also considers the forced marriage of a minor child to be a form of child abuse, since the child will presumably be subjected to non-consensual sex.''.

(B) The United States Agency for International Development observes that Child, Early, and Forced Marriage (In this paragraph referred to as ''CEFM'') ''impedes girls' education and increases early pregnancy and the risk of maternal mortality, obstetric complications, gender-based violence, and HIV/AIDS. Children of young mothers have higher rates of infant mortality and malnutrition compared to children of mothers older than 18. . . . CEFM is also associated with reductions in economic productivity for individuals and nations at large. CEFM is a human rights abuse and a practice that undermines efforts to promote sustainable growth and development.''.

(C) Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 (Public Law 113–4; 127 Stat. 54), which requires the Secretary of State to establish and implement a multiyear strategy—

(i) to ''prevent child marriages''; and

(ii) to ''promote the empowerment of girls at risk of child marriage in developing countries''.

(13) In 2021, the National Strategy on Gender Equity and Equality named child marriage as a form of gender-based violence that undermines human rights globally and domestically, noting—