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of the Constitution of the United States. Having made this observation, and having endeavored to separate the resolution from personal considerations of every kind, I say that I cannot vote for it in the form in which it is now presented.

There are parts of it asking for information, which I believe it is the right of this House to call for, and to which I have no objection whatsoever. I believe, on hearing the resolution read, as I just now did for the first time, having been in attendance on the committee when the resolution was first introduced,—I believe, I say, that to those parts which do not bring into question any provisions of the Constitution, or the necessary secrecy to be observed on the part of the Executive, in respect to matters which concern the foreign relations of the country, I shall have no objection.

But the first, and as I think, the most material part of that resolution, requires an exhibition to this House of the manner in which a fund has been expended, which, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, has been hitherto buried in profound secrecy, and in respect to which it was the intention, as I have always understood, that perpetual secrecy should be maintained. The provision is, that a certain sum of money shall be placed at the disposal of the actual President of the United States, for which no other account shall be given than by a certificate under the hand of the President himself that it has been expended for the public benefit, and that document, when carried to the treasury, passes the account. It has been said, or at least intimated by gentlemen on this floor, that the object of this secret fund is necessary to corruption. This is not so. During the time I had the honor of occupying that station, I gave certificates for the expenditure of one year's appropriation of this fund, and it turned out to be altogether inadequate to the end to be accomplished; and there was no more corruption in the whole of the transaction for which that money was applied than there is in the debate of this House to-day. I do not say what it was for. I have never stated to anybody except to my successor in that office what the money was expended for. But immediately after he came into office, I made known to him the object of the expenditure; and he accomplished the purpose for which that money was designed, and of which I will only say that it was a treaty of commerce with the *Sublime Porte*. Now, if the House will only recollect for a moment what advantage and benefit have resulted to this country from that provision of the law giving to the President of the United States the power to apply a certain sum for secret-service money in our relations with foreign countries; if they will reflect what the state of things was at that time, and how necessary such a fund was to the accomplishment of the end which that negotiation with the *Sultan of Turkey* had in view, although probably there is not a member of the House who knew of any such money having been so expended; if, I say, the House will consider these things, and bear in mind with what effect that fund was used, they will be disposed, I think, to reconsider the opinion that it is a corruption fund, and will believe that it may be applied for purposes as fair and honorable as any country can require.

To the objections thus stated to the adoption of this resolution, I must add another—that there is any inquiry whatever, in regard to the secret service, to which this fund was applied, with reference to the negotiation in the *Ashburton* treaty. This must be altogether struck out before I can vote for the resolution.

Mr. C. J. INGERSOLL. There is not a word about the *Ashburton* treaty in the resolution.

Mr. ADAMS. Mr. Speaker, one of the objections I have to this resolution is, that it has not the very object which the mover of it says it has. It calls upon the President to give an account of moneys expended through the Department of State, and charges them as against the Secretary of State. Now, for the expenditure of that money, the Secretary of State, present or past, is no more responsible than you or I. The law itself requires that it shall be expended by order of the President

himself. It does not go through the Secretary of State. The order which I issued to that effect for the whole sum of money was not known to the Secretary of State at the time I made it, any more than it was to you an hour ago. The Secretary of State was not at the seat of Government at the time I directed the negotiation. He was not here for months afterwards. I do not know that he knows to this day for what that money was expended. The law itself gives to the President alone the power of expending it; and it is no more necessary that it should pass through the hands of the Secretary of State than that it should pass through this House. That is one of my reasons for objecting to the adoption of the resolution. It cannot bring the information it calls for; and if it is to produce any effect at all, it must be addressed to Mr. John Tyler, and not to the Secretary of State, or to the present President; for probably the present President knows no more than you or I, for what purpose the money was expended. It does not, I repeat, go through the Secretary of State. I do not know but what the President may authorize the Secretary of State to expend the money. That may have been the fact in the present case. But for it the President himself is responsible; and if the gentleman intends to impeach anybody for the expenditure of that money, it must be John Tyler, and not Daniel Webster.

Mr. C. J. INGERSOLL. I am anxious to say that in all this business, so far as I know, Mr. Tyler's conduct has been irreproachable, and that my object is to get at a guilty Secretary who abused that power.

Mr. ADAMS. Whether the Secretary abused that power or not, I will not undertake at present to say; but I do say, that if he had the power to abuse it, it was by the order of his superior, the President of the United States, who alone had the authority to expend the money. The Secretary of State had no more power to spend a dollar of it than you or I, Mr. Speaker, have to-day. Whatever expenditure was made by the Secretary of State, or through that Department, must have been made, and could be made in no other way, than by an order from the President. He is the responsible person, and if there has been any corruption in the expenditure of the money, which I do not in the slightest degree suspect, Mr. Tyler is the responsible person, and he it is who is to be called upon to account for it. I say, therefore, that if you send the resolution to the President of the United States, it is extremely probable that he may answer that he knows no more about it than you do. It does not follow that, because I communicated to my immediate successor for what purpose I had ordered an expenditure of this money—not through the Department of State, but through other channels—that other Presidents may have done so. Under the law which has been read by the chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means, [Mr. McKAY,] this money is to be accounted for by a personal certificate from the President, having no more reference to the Department of State than to the Department of the Treasury, and perhaps not so much. He is authorized and required to certify to the accounting officers for certain sums of money expended, with his approbation, for certain purposes, and that certificate is to answer for all the more minute details required in all other accounts settled at the Treasury Department. That certificate he must give, and he is responsible for it, as I have always held myself responsible to the country for all time, so long as I live, for the expenditure of that money.

And here I take occasion to say that I differ with the gentleman from Virginia, [Mr. BAYLY,] and, I believe, other gentlemen who have stated that the day of impeachment has passed, by the Constitution, from the moment the public office expires. I hold no such doctrine. I hold myself, so long as I have the breath of life in my body, amenable to impeachment by this House for everything I did during the time I held any public office.

Mr. BAYLY. Is not the judgment, in case of impeachment, removal from office?

Mr. ADAMS. And disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust, or profit, under the United States for ever afterwards—a punishment much greater in my opinion than removal from office. It clings to a man as long as he lives; and if any public officer ever put himself in a position to be tried by impeachment, he would have very little of my good opinion, if he did not think disqualification from holding office for life a more severe punishment than mere removal from office. I hold, therefore, that every President of the United States, every Secretary of State, every officer impeachable by the laws of the country, is as liable, twenty years after his office has expired, as he is whilst he continues in office; and if such is not the case, if an officer could thus ward off the pains of impeachment, what would be the value of the provision, or when do you suppose discoveries would be made that would render impeachment effectual? He made that would render impeachment effectual? He made that with reference to the provisions of the Constitution, and to the great object contemplated by these provisions; and I now say that if one tenth of the charges against the person who is here attacked are true, impeachment, in my humble judgment, is the course which ought to be pursued by this House; and that in that process of impeachment the usual requisites of justice to every man charged with heinous crimes and misdemeanors, should be complied with; that the accused should have notice of the evidence to be brought against him; that he may have the means of defence before the bar of this House; and that he may not be reached by side-blows by applications for what may be dragged up out of the Department of State, when he was in that office, to injure him in the public mind, probably for services of the first importance to the country.

As to other parts of the resolution, calling for copies of papers in relation to a fee probably paid to a lawyer in the defence of a man on trial in the State of New York, or other things, documents which may possibly bring up the broken ruins of a conflict between the Government of the United States and the Governor of the State of New York at that time, matters which I believe had much better be suffered to slumber, as they have done for many years past, when connected with the charge of corruption, I should be very reluctant to give my vote for such a call. As to the negotiation on the *Ashburton* treaty, I have no doubt that there were transactions passed between the proper departments, some parts of which may be brought to light by a call on the Department of State. But if the secret features of that negotiation are to be called for and laid before the House, I expect you will have calls for information, of which you will find no trace in the Department of State, and which will implicate, so far perhaps as even to expose to the chance of public censure, those by no means included in the resolutions. There is probably much secret history connected with that negotiation and that treaty, which I believe it would be quite as well to suffer to pass into oblivion. But if they are to be brought forth, I shall vote that all may be brought forth, and then I think we shall have public speculation resting on other persons besides the Secretary of State.

So far as concerns the charge of corruption against a Senator of the United States from my own immediate Commonwealth—a man highly honored by his fellow-citizens not only for the services rendered in the negotiation of that treaty, but for many other public services of the first importance, I, for my part, have no objection to call for anything in the Department of State, because it is my full belief that anything which is elicited by that inquiry will operate far more to justify him, than to sustain any charges against him. But, I repeat, if this call is to be made as to the employment of the secret-service money, in the course of that negotiation, it must be made not on the Department of State, but upon the President of the United States. The present President, I think it extremely probable, though it may not be so, will say that he knows no more about the application of the secret-service money at that time, than this House